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THE PROBLEM OF THE UNREPRESENTED,
MISREPRESENTED AND REBELLIOUS
DEFENDANT IN CRIMINAL COURT
Burton R. Laub*
Remember that no man can be a great advocate who is no lawyer.
Erskine I
For upwards of twenty years, the Supreme Court of the United States
has wrestled with the question whether an indigent defendant
charged with serious crime must, on request, be afforded the assist-
ance of counsel at public expense. In a series of landmark cases it has
decided such assistance must be afforded as a matter of constitutional
right.' Most trial judges are in agreement with these decisions, not
so much on constitutional grounds but because they see practical ad-
vantages therein, and because they would welcome an even broader
rule requiring every party to a lawsuit to have full representation.
While trial judges in those jurisdictions not having public defenders
have some concern over the mechanics of supplying and paying for
lawyers to assist indigents, they are in no panic about it, knowing
that the organized bar and the state legislatures will undoubtedly
solve many of their difficulties for them in the near future.
Experienced trial judges everywhere have had painful experiences
with unrepresented litigants, and if they have any quarrel with what
the Supreme Court has done, it is because the more acute aspects of
the problem have been left untouched by appellate decisions. Although
there are a few cases either upholding or condemning the manner in
which a judge has conducted the trial of the unrepresented accused,
there is no prescribed mode of procedure to act as a guide and com-
pass to lead judges through the maze of pitfalls which they may en-
counter at trial. Trying a case in criminal court with an unrepre-
sented defendant is often like riding a tiger from which one dares
* B.S., University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania;
Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Erie County, Pennsylvania.
1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 355 (1963); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
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not to dismount, and many a trial judge supplements his crier's open-
ing prayer with a muttered supplication of his own, ". . and, please,
God, let there be no unrepresented defendants in court today!"
The problem is easily stated thus: Can a trial judge really exercise
control of a criminal trial when the defendant is ignorant or unscru-
pulous and is unrepresented? The cause of the problem is likewise
easy to isolate, for many laymen, whether ignorant or shrewd, possess
the bad morals of heedless self-interest, 2 running roughshod over
precedent, order, rules of evidence and even decency, making the trial
a nightmare for the judge. Socrates jabbed his finger into the tender
spot of human psychology when he said, "The partisan, when he is
engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the quettion,
but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions."' 3
Few lawyers, even those rare pleaders whom Plato unflatteringly de-
scribed as cankers that poison and corrupt noble things, would be so
bold as to follow the lead of an unscrupulous or ignorant layman in
court, if not for professional considerations, at least for fear of that
awesome threat called contempt.4 But these things seldom seem to
affect such a layman. In a civil case he banks heavily upon his ignor-
ance, his rights as a citizen, and the indulgence of the court as insula-
tion against reprisals. But in a criminal case, he rises to new heights;
here he not only invites but welcomes disciplinary action, feeling that
this establishes such prejudice on the part of the court as to justify a
reversal in the event of a conviction. Moreover, when the restraining
influence of ethical counsel is absent, truth is often slain in its tracks
by a layman charged with crime, and the tenuous threat of perjury
which lurks behind his conduct is no deterrent to his present deter-
mination to win a favorable verdict whatever the cost. He is, there-
fore, apt to make his case so perfect in every detail that its very per-
fection, like an artificial flower, arouses suspicion. While grudging
admiration is sometimes aroused by these tactics, one cannot erase
the feeling expressed by Publilius Syrus that "Successful guilt is the
bane of society." If, as said in Betts v. Brady, 5 ". . . [T]he Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits the conviction . . . of one whose trial is
offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
right.. ." what can be said of an acquittal won by a similar trial?
2. "We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals."
F.D.R. Second Inaugural Address.
3. PHAEDO. Dialogues of Plato.
4. Unfortunately, there are some lawyers who perform in even worse
fashion than laymen. See U.S. v. Dennis, 183 F.2d. 201 (1950). On the other
side of the coin are lawyers fitting Thomas Fuller's description of the good
advocate as one who "will not plead that cause wherein his tongue Is confuted
by his conscience."
5. Betts v. Brady, Bupra note 1.
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The essentials of a fair trial have been variously described, 6 includ-
ing many facets of law and procedure with which everyone is famil-
iar, but no one could successfully argue that a presiding officer em-
powered to control the proceedings is not a prime requisite, and at
least one distinguished author believes that an independent bar also
has a place of prime importance in the scheme. 7 While there may be
some disagreement whether counsel is essential where not desired or
requested, it is likely that few would disagree that the likelihood of
achieving justice is enhanced when each party has a lawyer. It
would seem, therefore, that in examining this problem some consid-
eration should be given to the functions of both the court and counsel
at trial, for these are inextricably entwined in the matter.
Piero Calamandrei recites that he once saw a boy pull off the anten-
nae of a black beetle which was then placed at the edge of a road.
Deprived of his exploratory organs, the mutilated insect swayed from
side to side, turned in circles and became overturned by blades of
grass. "This picture," said Calamandrei, "Is recalled to me whenever
I think what the judicial process would become if, as some people
suggest, the lawyers, those sensitive antennae of justice, were elimi-
nated."8 The author of this statement might easily have used for his
illustration the lawyerless, pointless, hodge-podge trial of the Knave
of Hearts for the larceny of tarts, 9 but he would, perhaps, have
found a more poignant answer to his implied concern had he been
present at an American trial of a self-represented defendant charged
with crime; if he was fortunate enough to select the prototype of the
trials to be mentioned later in this paper, he might well have been
more vehement and forceful in his statements.
Whatever may be said of lawyers as a class, it should be recognized
that they supply a much needed catalyst in the chemistry of trial
practice, controlling the passions of the client, cooperating with the
court in its search for truth, and helping keep the proceedings within
prescribed limits so that they might not descend to the level of a
backyard brawl with no holds barred. Not only this, but their de-
tachment and training enable them to approach a factual and legal
problem with logic and science. If Susanna had not been represented
by Daniel,' 0 the perjury of the elders would have prevailed; if Ga-
maliel had not offered his services as counsel for the Apostles, they
6. See Com. v. Fugmann ,330 Pa. 4, 29, 198 Am. Jud. Soc'y AU. 99 (1938).
Goodhart, Legal Procedure and Democracy, 47 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y, p. 58 (1963-64).
8. Eulogy of Judges, 21 (1954).
9. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND, (1865).
10. Daniel 13 (Douay).
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too would have been condemned to death." True, a lawyer is prone
to turn the spotlight on facts which support his client's position and
often sublimates details which are unimportant thereto, but he knows
that his adversary will do the same, for this is our time-honored
means of ascertaining truth. Through the presentation of different
aspects of the same circumstances, the finder-of-fact is enabled to
recognize reality from a full face view after considering each con-
tending profile.
The judge, of course, has a most important function to perform.
He supervises the trial 12 and the word supervises implies something
more than merely acting as an umpire1 3 or moderator in a battle of
wits; 14 it imports such control of affairs as to prevent interference
with the proper flow of information into the jury box. This is not
confined solely to deciding what is or is not admissible. It includes
the prevention of unfairness of any sort, control of the manner in
which the parties conduct themselves, and the order in which each is
to offer and present his arguments. It certainly encompasses keep-
ing the trial in such an orderly and dignified climate that the jury
is not confused, distracted or impassioned. In exercising these func-
tions the judge must act with reasonable firmness when the occasion
demands, for "Justice can be as readily destroyed by the flaccidity of
the judge as by his tyranny; impartial trials need a firm hand as much
as a constant determination to give each one his due."15
Absent the ability to control the trial, the judge becomes like a
corpse at a funeral, a necessary item to make the affair a success but
unable to fashion the proceedings to his liking. The ability to control
connotes the power to exercise restraints and impose sanctions
against those who disobey rulings. Yet, in a criminal case, the judge.
may construct a dark record of prejudice if he wields a heavy hand.
As a judge, he may not be the defendant's advocate, yet he must guide
him through the procedural aspects of trial with appropriate advice
and counsel at prescribed moments. He must take due cognizance of
the defendant's ignorance of legal procedure and the rules of evidence.
Yet if the defendant ignores his instructions, there is little he can do
with safety except to give stern and repeated warnings. Even then,
if these make the written record look bad, a new trial may result. Re-
peated warnings without action converts the judge into a weakling;
11. The Acts, 5:34-40 (King James).
12. Com. v. Fugmann, supra note 5.
13. Herold v. Washington No. Ins. Co., 128 Pa. Super. 563, 194 A. 687
(1937).
14. Keating v. Belcher, 384 Pa. 129, 119 A.2d 535 (1956).
15. U. S. v. Dennis, Supra note 4 at p. 226.
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stern action, even outside the presence of the jury, may give the ap-
pearance of coercion or prejudice. It is a lottery which the judge does
not relish and in which he has barely a fifty-fifty chance of winning.
Acute difficulty is not unusual where the accused is highly intelli-
gent and knows the score. One such defendant became involved in a
series of self-represented actions in several federal courts wherein,
among other things, he claimed he was not given time to prepare for
trial; that he had been assigned inexperienced counsel and so was
forced to represent himself; that he was denied the opporutnity to
summon witnesses to testify in his own behalf, although the truth of
the matter was that when the court on appeal granted him this right,
he refused to name the witnesses. 16 At a subsequent time, he was
charged in a state court with burglary, larceny and receiving stolen
goods, and again, with variations and additional stratagems, as-
serted the same matters.1 7 He first brought unsuccessful habeas cor-
pus proceedings to test the sufficency of the Commonwealth's evidence
at the preliminary hearing. Competent counsel was appointed for
him in this effort. When the case was called for trial, he asked leave
to discharge his counsel and try the case himself and although coun-
sel was repeatedly offered to him thereafter, he refused to accept
assistance. The trial court, in order to protect itself against the
standby counsel to sit through the case and be in readiness if the de-
fendant felt that he needed him. Thereafter, the defendant was
guilty of tactics, well planned in the opinion of the trial judge, which
would not have been attempted or tolerated by or in a lawyer. He
presented the court with the names of eighteen witnesses whom he
desired to have subpoenaed in his defense.' s The court directed the
sheriff to subpoena these witnesses, with instructions to afford them
transportation from their homes one hundred and thirty miles away
to the court and return, should their presence be actually required by
the defendant. Only one of these witnesses voluntarily appeared in
16. The Federal proceedings are listed in Com. v. Helwig, 184 Pa. Super.
370, 134 A.2d 694. (1957)
17. Com. v. Helwig, 40 Erie 64. (1956)
18. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that some day an accused
will hand the trial judge a telephone directory and ask that every one whose
name appears therein be subpoenaed in his behalf, basing his demand on Art.
1, § 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution giving him the right to the compulsory
attendance of witnesses in his favor. The trial judge will then probably try
to determine whether the supposed witnesses are, in fact, witnesses in the
case and will call upon the defendant to show cause why he is entitled to the
service he demands. To this the defendant will answer that whom he wishes
to call in his own defense in his own considered discretion, that the court
may not require him to reveal his defense in advance of trial and that the only
time the court may pass upon the relevancy of testimony is when the witness is
on the stand and objection has been made.
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court and the defendant promptly excused him. A few days later,
the court inquired of the defendant whether he would need any of
these witnesses for his defense and the judge was given the
names of four of them, including the same witness whom the defend-
ant had previously excused. These witnesses were eventually called
at the county's expense and their testimony was of little consequence.
The trial court in its opinion refusing a new trial, expressed its opin-
ion that the defendant by naming these witnesses was merely setting
the stage for raising the precise question he had previously raised
successfully in federal court.
At a high cost to the public, this defen'dant cluttered up the record
with repetitious cross-examination, repeated flaunting of rules of evi-
dence, lengthy colloquies, repeated motions, arguments and other
devices calculated to try the patience of the judge and trap him into
committing reversible error. In cross-examining a Commonwealth's
witness he cleverly phrased his questions so that the correct answers
would disclose the fact that defendant had been in prison and had a
criminal record. In commenting upon the phase of the trial, the
Superior Court on appeal restricting the introduction of a defendant's
criminal record, and his cross-examination was a clever plan to bring
about the disclosure he later complained about. Said Judge Watkins,
on behalf of the court,
"While pretending to seek sympathy from the court because
of his self-inflicted burden of defending himself, the knowl-
edge he disclosed of the law with regard to the introduction
of distinct crimes suggests that he shrewdly hoped to use
this protection of the accused as a means of obtaining a re-
versal in the event the verdict went against him."' 9
Another convicted defendant, lacking the intelligence and shrewd-
ness of the one just referred to, but motivated by greater malice,
illustrates the extent to which a self-represented defendant will go
in distorting truth and attempting to pervert the safeguards which
a benign system has built in behalf of an accused. This convict
brought a habeas corpus action alleging that he had been made to
stand trial without counsel; that the trial judge conducted the trial
like a Roman Circus and was prejudiced against him. At the hear-
ing on the writ, he vigorously denied that the services of a lawyer
had been offered to him. As disclosed by the record, this was what
occurred with respect to counsel: when defendant was brought up
before the court on arraignment, the assignment judge offered to ap-
point counsel for him but the defendant refused to accept assistance.
When the jury had been selected and the case was sent to another
19. Com. v. Helwig, Supra note 16, at 378, 134 A.2d at 698.
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courtroom for trial, the trial judge in that court room offered to
appoint a lawyer to assist the defendant. This was refused and
defendant insisted on going to trial without representation. After
conviction, the defendant moved for a new trial and argued his
own case before the court in banc. At the argument, the trial
judge suggested that it was not too late to supply defendant with
state-paid counsel and offered to appoint a lawyer to represent him.
The defendant refused to accept legal counsel and persisted in
making his own argument. Later, when defendant brought his
habeas corpus proceedings, state-paid counsel was afforded him but
after the hearing the defendant discharged his lawyer, stating that
he could do a better job on appeal himself, refusing to sign and
swear to a petition for leave to appeal his conviction nun pro tunc,
the appeal time having lapsed.
It might also be interesting to note what the record disclosed
as to the defendant's other allegations, i.e., that the trial was con-
ducted like a Roman Circus and the judge was prejudiced. In sup-
port of these averments in his petition, the defendant (now the
relator) testified that the judge had allowed free reign to the district
attorney to push defendant around and take advantage of him; that
the trial was a farce from beginning to end; that the judge was
prejudiced against him, did not give him a break, and ignored the
jury's recommendation of mercy by turning a deaf ear to the jury's
plea to "please, please, please" have mercy on the defendant, and
to prove this point the defendant argued that he had been given
the severist possible sentence. When the hearing judge, who had
also been trial judge, remarked that no such ridiculous spectacle as
a pleading jury ever occurred, the defendant boldly stated that it
did happen and that he would match his credibility with that of tha
judge.
At the argument on the defendant's motion for a new trial ten
months before the habeas corpus hearing referred to above, the
entire proceeding was taken down stenographically and transcribed.
As revealed by the record of that argument, this is what the de-
fendant then thought of both the trial and the trial judge: he told
the court in banc that the judge had helped him out of his discus-
sion before the jury on circumstantial evidence; that the trial judge
had done a fine job of backing up his rights and even asked the trial
judge to continue to do so at the argument. He admitted that the
trial judge had tried to prevent him from introducing his own prior
criminal record into evidence as a part of his defense and had cau-
tioned him about its possible adverse effect. In this connection the
defendant said, "You gave me all the opportunity there, I will grant
19641
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that. You were very wonderful to me in the courtroom, there's no
question of that. I have no squawks about that, as far as being
tried in justice." And what of the complaint about the jury's rec-
ommendation and the severe sentence? The record disclosed that
the jury made no recommendation of mercy at all and the sentencing
judge imposed a term substantially less than that allowed by law.2 0
There is still a third situation in the same court which illustrates
how a resourceful unrepresented defendant can impose upon the
trial court and lay traps calculated to ensnare the judge. In this
case,2 1 counsel was initially supplied to the defendant without cost
to him. Thereafter, the defendant, without the knowledge or as-
sistance of court-appointed counsel made a series of applications
to the court, asking that he be supplied with law books, transcripts
of cases involving other defendants charged with the same offenses,
and asking for a reduction of bail. Because the defendant seemed
to be by-passing counsel, the court became concerned that there
might be dissatisfaction with the appointment or some other cir-
cumstance might be present interfering with the lawyer-client re-
lationship. Accordingly, the defendant and his counsel were brought
into open court and inquiry was made by the judge respecting the
situation. At this interview, the defendant told the judge that his
lawyer was competent, useful and satisfactory but that he had con-
cluded to try the case by himself. The court then advised the
defendant of the advantages of representation and offered to replace
counsel with another of defendant's choosing if that was desired.
The defendant rejected this offer by saying that he was satisfied
with his lawyer but only needed him in an advisory capacity. There-
after, the defendant and his advisory lawyer disagreed as to what
should or should not be done and by mutual consent another compe-
tent and skillful lawyer was substituted in place of the original.
The defendant apparently changed his mind again and this time al-
lowed his second lawyer to conduct the defense for him, although
he interfered with the trial and even insisted on cross-examining at
one point.
Following the defendant's conviction, he, acting as his own coun-
sel, applied for a writ of habeas corpus.2 2 In his petition for the
writ, defendant averred, among other things, that his counsel had
been incompetent and unfaithful and had failed to subpoena wit-
nesses. He complained that the court had never advised him of his
20. Com. ex rel. Marchillo v. Myers, C.P., Erie County, 289 Sept. Sessions,
1963.
21. Com. v. Wilson, Q.S., Erie County, 95-99 November Term, 1960.
22. Com. ex rel. Wilson v. Reeder, C.P. Erie County, (694 February Ses-
sions 1963)
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rights or given him the rights to which he was entitled. Yet the
record disclosed a lengthy interview between the court and the de-
fendant in which he was fully told what his rights were, and the
trial record disclosed that the sole witness whom the defendant
wished to call had, in fact, been subpoenaed by his trial counsel
and that virtually every request made by the defendant, except
that he be discharged, was granted.
From the cases just discussed it can be seen that even repre-
sentation by counsel at the initial stages of the proceedings some-
times complicates matters, for a defendant often insists upon cross-
examining witnesses, arguing to the jury, raising objections, and
in generally interfering with the orderly conduct of the trial even
though his lawyer is present to act in his behalf. In this there is
no clearly defined course which a trial judge may follow with safety,
and the situation can become perilously acute if unethical counsel
cooperates with the defendant and advises him in secret how to
proceed. A startling example of the chaos which such conduct can
create appears in the record of the Communist conspiracy trials
presided by Judge Medina in 1949,23 a case which probably pro-
vided the script for a number of criminal cases which followed in
other jurisdictions.
In that case, Eugene Dennis, one of the defendants, discharged
his lawyer before the jury had been completed even though the
judge advised him that he might, by so doing, sacrifice some of his
rights. What happened thereafter justified the United State's At-
torney's fear that this was a device to enable Dennis to inject im-
proper matters in the case. 2 4 In opening to the jury Dennis fre-
quently ignored the issues, enlarged on the virtues of the Com-
munist party and discussed an economic depression which, he said,
had already begun in this country. He refused to conclude his
arguments on objections when commanded to do so by the judge
and this evoked an utterance by Judge Medina which laid the ground
rules which both the judge and the defendants later followed to
the hilt. "I suppose," said the judge, "that you are just daring me
to do something. You gentlemen can be just as disorderly, just
as unruly as you choose, but you will not goad me into taking hasty
action which may create a prejudicial atmosphere." The extent to
which counsel and the defendants participated in the disgraceful
process of corrupting the cause of justice can be seen in Judge
Medina's memorandum accompanying his order holding some of coun-
sel and Dennis for contempt. In it he related that the defendants
23. U.S. v. Foster, C. 128-87, U.S. Dist. Ct., Southern Dist. of N.Y.
24. See HAWTHORNE DANIEL, BIOGRAPHY OF JUDGE MEDINA, p. 241.
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(in the contempt proceeding) had disregarded repeated warnings
of the court; had made insulting insinuations and charges against
the trial judge; and made continuous and repeated objections to
evidence notwithstanding it had been ruled at the outset that all
objections and exceptions would inure to the benefit of all defend-
ants; had persisted in making long, repetitious, and unsubstantial
arguments, objections, and protests, working in shifts, accompanied
by shouting, sneering, and snickering; had disregarded repeatedly
and flagrantly the orders of the court not to argue without permis-
sion and to desist from further arguments or comments; had disre-
garded rulings on evidence, asked questions on excluded matters,
accused the court of race prejudice without cause, and generally
conducted themselves in a most provocative manner in an endeavor
to call forth some intemperate or undignified response from the
court.
Nor was Dennis the only defendant guilty of misconduct. Gilbert
Green, although represented by counsel, frequently volunteered state-
ments in angry, sarcastic voice before the jury, implying that the
judge was denying the defendants their rights. This came after the
court had issued repeated admonitions and after there had been
serious disturbances in the court in which Green had participated.
As a result of this conduct, the judge had to commit him for con-
tempt for the balance of the trial. 2 5 It was necessary for the judge
to hold another defendant, John Gates, in contempt. This defendant
refused to reveal the identity of certain persons involved in his
testimony, even though the court had directed him to do so. The
defendant's answer, among other things, was that he would be
unable to raise his head in decent society if he ". . . became a stool
pigeon under the direction of the court or anbody else." As a
result of his refusal to answer, the judge was constrained to sen-
tence him to prison for thirty days unless he earlier purged him-
self. 2 6 Not only this, but the defendant Davis, who had been rep-
resented by competent counsel throughout the trial, attempted to
discharge his lawyer for the purpose of making the final summa-
tion to the jury on his own behalf. The judge refused the privilege
of making the summation on the ground that Davis had repeatedly
interfered with the conduct of the trial, that he had not confined
his testimony to the questions asked him, that he had three times
taken part in outbursts and had been disorderly and contemptuous.
The judge feared, and not without reason, that to let him address
the jury would be to invite similar unconscionable practices. 27
25. U.S. v. Green, 176 F. 2d 169 (1949)
26. U.S. v. Gates, 176 F. 2d 78 (1949)
27. U.S. v Dennis, Supra, note 4 at p. 233.
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These are extreme cases and fortunately are not representative
of the average. They do illustrate, however, what can and fre-
quently does happen. Further, there is one other factor which
bears upon the problem and that is that many scrupulous self-
represented defendants are thoroughly ignorant, not only of law
and its processes, but of things in general, and these can cause nearly
as much difficulty as the unscrupulous, schrewd and rebellious litigant.
The problem here is not the occasional humerous incident such as the
apocryphal story of the self-represented defendant who, when asked
if he cared to challenge the jury replied, "I think I can lick the
little fellow on the end seat"; the problem goes deeper than that.
Such a defendant must literally be led by the hand throughout the
entire trial. He must be counseled how to strike the jury, how to
make an opening address, how to cross-examine, how to object to
evidence, when and how he may testify, and what effect the evi-
dence has in relation to the substantive law. A defendant of this
nature, when afforded an opportunity to cross-examine, usually
starts out, "He said that I stole the purse and ran; well I didn't do
any such thing," or "Your honor, this man is lying and I can prove
it. Just give me a chance to call my brother in Buffalo and he'll
tell you I was up there at that time," or some similar form of ap-
proach. It is usually idle for the judge to instruct the defendant
that he must confine himself to questions, for when the explanation
is made, the defendant shakes his head in confusion and, not un-
derstanding the intricacies of such a procedure, usually replies hope-
lessly that he has no questions to ask. When afforded the oppor-
tunity to sum up to the jury, his speech is usually a repetition of
the contention that he didn't do it, or he asks the jury to let him
go on general principles, sometimes banking this plea on the lack
of counsel, ignorance of court procedure and the general observa-
tion that he is a "hard-working" man with a family to support.
This is pitiful in the case of a defendant who may be innocent, but
it is disturbing in any case because the judge cannot escape the
feeling that the trial has not performed its true function and that
he has unwittingly been made a part of it.
Just what prompts litigants to refuse counsel when offered, or
to neglect to hire counsel when they can to afford it, is not ap-
parent. It may be that the lurid courtroom scenes they have seen
on television have led them to the belief that they are super-pleaders
or that a trial is a simple matter requiring no special skills. In
the case of an innocent accused it may be that he has such a blind
faith in his own innocence and the infallibility of justice that he
believes he will be acquitted no matter what. In fact, there is a
multitude of reasons behind the refusal of representation. Whatever
19641
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these reasons may be, it is apparent that both civil 28 and criminal
litigants occasionally prefer to proceed without counsel and this
always puts the judge in a delicate position. Judge Woodside of the
Superior Court, in an address before the Pennsylvania Bar Asso-
ciation, spoke of the dilemma of appellate courts in dealing with
criminal problems, but what he said was equally applicable to trial
courts. "Drawing the line between the accused and the officers of
his government," he said, "is a difficult and serious problem for ap-
pellate courts. If it is drawn too far in one direction, individual
freedom will be lost through the abuse of governmental power. If
it is drawn too far in the other direction, free government has in-
sufficient protection against the criminals."' 2 9
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees an accused the right to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense. Article 1, § 9, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania pro-
vides that the accused has the right to be heard by himself and by
counsel. Nowhere in either of these organic laws can we find any
provision authorizing a court or a legislature to force counsel upon
an unwilling accused, and not matter how salutary it might be from
the standpoint of trial judges or the community to have every crim-
inal defendant represented in court, defending a charge of crime
is so personal and serious a matter that society has no legal or
moral right to invade the cloister of the defendant's considered dis-
cretion. Thus, we have what gamblers call a Mexican Standoff-
a balance of rights between the people and the individual which
cannot be resolved except by applying the evanescent test of fair-
ness to specific cases. It is one thing to say that an accused in a
criminal case must be supplied with counsel upon request; it is
another to say that he must have such counsel even though not
desired.
The flood of applications for writs of habeas corpus gushing from
our prisons is a clear indication that convicted criminals, at least,
are well aware of the determination of the highest courts to protect
and preserve human rights. More law is daily discussed in prisons
than in the law schools. For this reason it is the court-wise, prison-
28. In a civil case tried by the author as judge, the plaintiffs represented
themselves. One of the plaintiffs kept up a running fire of comment while the
defendants' witnesses were on the stand, stating out loud, "You're a God-damned
liar," etc. Throughout the case the plaintiffs addresse dthe judge as "Hey, you,"
or simply calling him by his last name without prefix. The judge, after a few
days of this, suggested that it might be a little more respectful if the plaintiffs
referred to him as "Your Honor" or, at least, as "judge." To this suggestion one
plaintiff answered, "Alright, L ...............
29. Com. v. Helwig, supra note 16, at 380, 134 A.2d at p. 699.
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wise, convict who gains the most benefit from circumscribing rules,
rather than the first offender, casual offender or innocent, accused.
This, of course, does not argue relaxation of the strict principles
of fairness, enunciated or lying dormant, which inhere to our con-
cept of justice. It is just as offensive to invade and impair the rights
of an habitual criminal as it is to trample the innocent underfoot.
While trial judges must continue to play each case by ear, ap-
pellate courts, by thoroughly understanding the problem and by
precise rulings on its specific facets can be of help. In the Com-
munist conspiracy trials mentioned above, the Second Circuit of
the United States Court of Appeals, in an able opinion by Judge
Learned Hand,3 0 dealt somewhat with the plight of Medina and his
manner of presiding over the trial. In that opinion, more was said
about the conduct of counsel than of the defendants, although in
dealing with the ruling refusing the defendant Davis the right to
discharge his counsel and address the jury himself, there was some
mention of the defendant's conduct as justification for the trial
judge's action. While the setting of the case might well have justi-
fied the court in making stern and pertinent comment on the de-
fendants' actions and in issuing pronouncement which might be of
help to trial judges in the future, the court contented itself with a
restrained critique. 3 1 Instead of pointing out that the defendants,
by their own conduct, invited reprisals from the judge and created
an atmosphere of pressure of such magnitude that an implied waiver
of self-constructed error became manifest, the opinion was almost
an apology for the judge's actions. It admitted that at times he
used language short of requisite judicial gravity and pointed out
that his repeated cautionary instructions to the jury would not have
been enough to excuse him had he, in fact, weighed the scales against
the defendants. In truth, the opinion hinted that the trial judge
might have been wrong in some instances, for this was said: "The
record discloses a judge, sorely tried for many months of turmoil,
constantly provoked by useless bickering, exposed to offensive slights
and insults, harried with interminable repetition, who, if at times
he did not conduct himself with the imperturbability of Rhadaman-
thus,3 2 showed considerably greater self-control and forebearance
that it is given to most judges to possess." It is submitted with some
diffidence that under the circumstances the court might easily and
logically have said that any defendant who enters the lists with
swinging sword and direct attack upon the trial judge without
provocation and manifestly to prevent a calm disclosure of truth,
30. U.S. v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 208 (1950).
31. Id. at 225-26.
32. Id. at 226, Italics supplied.
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must be deemed to waive any objection he might have to any human
response a mere trial judge might make to such assault. What is
even more unfortunate, perhaps, is the circumstance that the Su-
preme Court of the United States affirmed the convictions without
allowing certiorari to include the conduct of the trial within its
compass. 3 3 Had the certiorari been broad enough to include the
entire matter, we might now have available some pronouncement
of value on this point from the highest court of the land. In fact,
the Supreme Court ignored another chance to deal with the problem
in United States v. Aviles, 3 4 where one of the defendants in the
court below burst into a tirade before the jury in which he asserted
that all those on trial were convicts and that some of them were
then serving time in prison. The circuit court rejected the conten-
tions of the other defendants and this was such prejudicial error
as to require a new trial, holding that the trial judge's cautionary
instructions were sufficient to protect them. The Supreme Court
refused certiorari. 3 5
Of some comfort to trial judges is the decision in United States v.
Bentvena. 3 6 The trial judge in that case (MacMahon) was no panty-
waist, even though the conduct of some of the defendants was calcu-
lated to upset him and trap him into reversible error. There, one of
the defendants climbed into the jury box, walked along the inside of
the rail from one end of the box to the other, pushing the jurors in
the front row and screaming vilifications at them, the judge, and the
other defendants. Another defendant, when he was being cross-
examined, picked up the witness chair and hurled it at the Assistant
United States Attorney, narrowly missing him. The chair was shat-
tered against the jury box. The defendants engaged in a series of off-
stage activities which were also designed to interfere with the trial.
Some of them feigned accidents and illnesses; two of them claimed
they had been drugged and didn't know what transpired in the court-
room; one of them feigned an attempted suicide by hanging at De-
tention Headquarters and the very next day feigned another at-
tempted suicide by making inconsequential cuts on his wrists.
The judge responded with briskness to the outbursts of the two
defendants who created scenes in the courtroom by having them
gagged and shackled as well as holding them for contempt. A total
of eleven defendants were sentenced for contempt for their behavior
during trial. In affirming the convictions of all but four of the defend-
33. Dennis V. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
34. 274 F.2d 179 (1960).
35. 362 U.S. 974, (1960).
36. 319 F.2d 916 (1963).
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ants, the second circuit was equally as firm as the trial judge. It held
that he was justified, and indeed was forced, to resort to stern meas-
ures to obtain order in the courtroom. In so doing, this was said:
"Law enforcement and fair trial for those accused of viola-
tions is not to be limited to the pattern chosen by defendants.
The administration of criminal justice in the federal courts
will not be delivered into the hands of those who could gain
only from its subversion. . . . It may take two to conspire
but it takes only one to throw a chair at the prosecutor."'37
While ordinarily a paper of this sort ends with some sort of sugges-
tion to palliate whatever evil may be under consideration, this one
must trial off into nothingness, for no remedy suggests itself other
than a better understanding by appellate court judges of trial prob-
lems. The second circuit in Bentvena put it this way:
"It should not be the function of an appellate court with all
the advantages of hindsight to substitute itself for the trial
judge and to declare how it might have handled each situa-
tion or to deliver lengthy admonitions to trial judges on the
properties of conducting these difficult criminal trial and the
need to avoid embroilment with defendants and defense coun-
sel despite the kind of provocation evident here."13 s
This, at least, is a recognition that the common sense doctrine of
sudden emergency available to a party charged with negligence might
look well in an appellate court proceeding in which a trial judge is
charged with error of the kind under discussion.
Absent any other remedy, trial judges can do little more than find
a sympathetic depository for their tears.
37. U.S. v. Bentvena, Supra 35, p. 931.
38. Id. p. 933.
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